GREYCORTEX

ADVANCED, UNKNOWN MALWARE IN THE HEART OF EUROPE

AGENDA

Network Traffic Analysis: What, Why, Results

Malware in the Heart of Europe

Bonus Round



WHAT: NETWORK TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

Gartner

= Statistical analysis, **machine learning**, **artificial intelligence**, metadata, and content inspection to detect suspicious activities in the network

- Mirrored network traffic via TAP/SPAN
- Flow analysis, full-packet capture





Unknown malware Insider threats Forensic investigation Network visibility IoT and BYOD devices



Rapid Detection & Response





NTA RESULTS

Detect Threats



Visualize the Full Network







Uses

ARTIFICAL INTELLIGENCE MACHINE LEARNING BIG DATA ANALYSIS

To Help

GOVERNMENTS + CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE+ ENTERPRISE

MAKE IT OPERATIONS SECURE AND RELIABLE





Customer and PoC Network Examples



CASE 1 – LETHIC SPAMBOT

A Device in the Observed Network:

Queried external DNS servers (Google) for known-infected server names

Communicated via port 1123 to servers in Norway

Silenced traffic when the device was running anti-virus scanner and remained silent for the next two hours, later resuming communication on port 1123

Communicated periodically to MS Hotmail service on port 25/tcp



CASE 1 – LETHIC SPAMBOT

Unsupervised Learning	Machine Behavior	Flow-based Detection	Discovery Analysis	Other
Outlier: high number of communication peers & flows	SMTP Permanent Communication Anomaly: Communicated periodically to MS Hotmail service on port 25/tcp		A new service on a host discovered	IDS rule matched (Lethic SpamBOT) External DNS server, poor reputation Ips High external DNS traffic (1-2 queries reached170)





CASE 2 – ETERNAL BLUE

A Device on the Observed Network:

Suddenly used a DNS tunnel and TOR network together, exchanging one message

<u>After 4 hours of waiting, it started opening port 445/tcp connections on</u> multiple external hosts

Tried to use CVE-2017-0143 (exploit MS17-010) on the connected host



CASE 2 – ETERNAL BLUE

Unsupervised Learning	Machine Behavior	Flow-based Detection	Discovery Analysis	Other
Outlier: high number of communication peers & flows		Network scan 445/tcp to internet		Correlation rule matched: malware spreading to internet
				IDS rules matched: DNS tunnel, TOR
				A day after updated IDS rule matched: Eternal Blue (based on CVE-2017-0143, exploit MS17-010)





CASE 3 – WANNACRY

A Device on the Observed Network:

Started opening port 445/tcp connections on multiple hosts, external and internal

Successfully used CVE-2017-0143 (exploit MS17-010) on another internal host immediately

The second device started exhibiting the same behavior





CASE 3 – WANNACRY

Unsupervised Learning	Machine Behavior	Flow-based Detection	Discovery Analysis	Other
Outlier: high number of communication peers & flows		Network scan 445/tcp to internal network and internet		Correlation rule matched: malware spreading to internal network A day after updated IDS rule matched: WannaCry variant (CVE-2017-0143, exploit MS17-010)





CASE 4 – SSH ATTACK

Identified at a Perimeter Router:

Consecutive IP addresses in the public range were tried in an effort to open a session on port 22/tcp; by a host in Canada

Subsequently, a high number of connections via port 22/tcp to some hosts in the range were detected



CASE 4 – SSH ATTACK

Unsupervised Learning	Machine Behavior	Flow-based Detection	Discovery Analysis	Other
		SSH port sweep (22/tcp)		
		Brute force SSH attack (22/tcp)		
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CASE 5 – UNKNOWN (YET) BOTNET

A Device on an Internal Network:

Periodically attempts to communicate with blacklisted IP addresses at port 30303





CASE 5 – UNKNOWN (YET) BOTNET

Unsupervised Learning	Machine Behavior	Flow-based Detection	Discovery Analysis	Other
	Periodic repetitive communication at port 30303			Communication with blacklisted IP





the listed host addresses to multiple addresses on the same service.

Class: Network scan

CASE 6 – DOCUMENT LEAKAGE

A Device on an Internal Network:

Exhibited an unusually high data transfer volume to an external network





CASE 6 – DOCUMENT LEAKAGE

Unsupervised Learning	Machine Behavior	Flow-based Detection	Discovery Analysis	Other
Outlier: high volume of data transfer detected (Severity 7) Outlier: high volume of data transfer detected (Severity 5)				L7 content analysis: file named _Financial_Summary _Q1.pdf_ uploaded to www21.filehosting.or g; a domain of Hetzner Online GmbH





CASE 7 – ALL TOGETHER

Cases 1-6 Combined



CASE 7 – ALL TOGETHER

Unsupervised Learning	Machine Behavior	Flow-based Rules	Discovery Analysis	Other
Outliers: data, flows, packets, peers, hosts, ports, performance Bayesian Expectation Maximization Gaussian Mixture Models	Repetitive periodic connections or checks	Port scan Port sweep Brute-force Dictionary attacks Data enumeration DoS, DDoS	Detection of new or lost/unreachable: services, devices (IP, MAC, hostname), gateways, VLANs, subnets Detection of changed/duplicated hostname/IP/MAC, changed VLAN,	Event correlation L7 content analysis (DPI) Tunneled and encrypted data inspection IDS in the internal network, all rules active (45k+)





"BONUS" – CAUTIONARY TALES

Ministry "Outer System" E-mail Server Provided Mailbox Access:

- To IP addresses of Tor endpoints and to server hosting PhpBB forum "СуперМамочки Нижнекам (<u>static.7.236.46.78.clients.your-server.de</u>, Hetzner Online GmbH)
- 170 accounts/users compromised, unnoticed almost a year
- More than 7100 documents stolen.
- The attacker "basically maintained undisturbed access to any of the email accounts"
- "Strategic advantage" gained?

Vulnerable Network at Political Organization:

- Multiple intrusions by different organizations (2015, 2016)
- Unnoticed almost a year
- Internal strategy documents, emails, and possible donor lists stolen

Spear-Phishing Attack on Campaign Manager:

- Fake security alert/log-in page
- Identified as "legitimate" by security team (or not)
- Secret to creamy risotto





"BONUS" CASE – FINDINGS, VERDICT

Findings

- Weak or leaked account password ("admin5") using single factor authentication for strong accounts.
- Using private accounts for work, prone to social engineering, etc.
- No proper evaluation of operations data in place, no insight

Verdict

- Always watch what happens in your network, use the right tools!
- Do not trust administrators, they have too much power!
- And ...

GOTTA CATCH 'EM ALL.





PALDIES PAR JŪSU UZMANĪBU!

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